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I. INTRODUCTION
Thirty feet outside the main gate of Camp Casey,' a group of soldiers
wait for the cross-walk light to flash permission to walk. The traffic rolls
steadily down the musky street, passing lines of small shops, hocking their
various goods through large, garish windows. The soldiers are signaled to
walk. They make their way across the street, under the overpass and down
to a strip of bars known as the "ville," or "down range."2 Gaudy bar lights
flicker even at midday, while small rabbles of scantily-clad Filipinas and
the occasional Russian peek out of the darkened windows, giggling and
calling to passers to come into their bars.3 This area, which is off-limits to
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1. Camp Casey is approximately ten miles from the Demilitarized Zone in the Republic of
Korea (South Korea), and approximately forty miles north of Seoul. Camp Casey Enclave,
GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/camp-casey.htm (last visited
Sept. 29, 2010).
2. The author was enlisted in the United States Army as an infantryman from 2004-2008.
From January 2006 through January 2007, the author was stationed at Camp Casey, which is
located next to Tongduchon, the Republic of Korea (South Korea). Many of the author's statements are
derived from his personal knowledge and experiences while serving in the United States Army in the
Republic of Korea. Any names of soldiers or their wives have been changed for confidentiality
purposes. See also Donald MacIntyre, Base Instincts, TIME, Aug. 05, 2002, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,501020812-333899,00.html (last visited Sept. 14,
2010) [hereinafter Macintyre].
3. The author's personal knowledge and experiences. See also Macntyre, supra note 2.
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Koreans,4 is swarming with these young women. Soldiers know them as
"juicy girls," "drinky girls," or "juicies" or "drinkies" for short.5
Every soldier in Area I, before being allowed to go into the "ville"
with a battle-buddy, must be given a tour of the bar area by his squad or
team leader, who is typically a noncommissioned officer (NCO).7 During
the tour, responsible NCOs explain the rules of conduct for the "ville,"
punishments for violations of the rules, and of course, they address the
swarms of females in high heels and miniskirts that accost every soldier that
pass their bar.' Some NCOs elaborate on the human trafficking brief that
the soldiers received during in-processing. And some even admonish the
use of the young ladies as prostitutes.9
The majority of the Filipinas near military camps in South Korea are
there on entertainment visas.o But the procurement and abuse of these
visas has become the subject of international scrutiny and action." The
U.S. military and the Republic of Korea (ROK) recognize that many of the
bars surrounding U.S. bases and camps in the ROK are staffed by trafficked
4. The author's personal knowledge and experiences. See also Macintyre, supra note 2.
5. The author's personal knowledge and experiences. See Maclntyre, supra note 2. See also
Jon Rabiroff & Hwang Hae-Rym, 'Juicy Bars' Said to be Havens for Prostitution Aimed at U.S.
Military, STARS AND STRIPES, Sept. 9, 2009, available at http://www.stripes.com/news/juicy-bars-said-
to-be-havens-for-prostitution-aimed-at-u-s-military-1.8019 (last visited Sept. 14, 2010) [hereinafter
Havens].
6. The Republic of Korea (ROK) is divided into seven commands. Area I encompasses
Camp Casey. See Memorandum from Walter L. Sharp, General U.S. Army Commander, on U.S. Forces
Korean (USFK) Command Policy Letter #6, Buddy System (May 25, 2006), available at
http://www.usfk.milusflcfUploads/140/IUSFK%2OCPLO6.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2010). In the
author's experience, the Battle Buddy System was always in effect. Further, Camp Casey and Camp
Red Cloud both have mandatory "ville" tours for each soldier before they are allowed to leave the gate
and explore with their Battle Buddy.
7. In 2006, when the author arrived in the ROK to report for duty, he was given a tour of the
"ville," as was the protocol at that time, before he would be allowed to go down there on his time off.
The tour was to be given by a team leader, which was typically a sergeant (E-5) or above.
8. The author's personal knowledge and experiences.
9. The author's personal knowledge and experiences.
10. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 176 (2009), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/123357.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2010) [hereinafter TIP
REPORT 2009]. See generally Havens, supra note 5 (stating that the arrival of the Filipinas to the ROK
is government sanctioned. In order to be allowed into the country on an entertainment visa, the Filipina
women must first record a video of themselves singing and dancing. This video is sent to the Korea
Media Rating Board for review.).
11. See Jon Rabiroff, Franklin Fisher, Hwang Hae-Rym & Franklin Fisher, Philippines Stops
Authorizing Women to Work at 'Juicy Bars' Near US. Bases, STARS AND STRIPES, Feb. 5, 2010,
available at http://www.stripes.com/news/philippines-stops-authorizing-women-to-work-at-juicy-bars-
near-u-s-bases-1.98618 (last visited Sept. 14,2010) [hereinafter Philippines Stops].
persons.12 While anti-human trafficking policies have become a prominent
international political issue, 3 the efficacy of the U.S. and ROK policies
have been only moderately effective at best, as the focus is on prostitution,
rather than the trafficking itself.14
Part II of this article depicts trafficking in persons, in general, and the
use of trafficked persons as prostitutes in the ROK. It will also discuss how
the U.S. military stationed in the ROK has created the demand, and
therefore, must be part of the solution. Part III contains a brief narrative of
the United States and Department of Defense (DoD) responses to trafficked
persons legislation and policy, but is limited to discussing only what is
pertinent to the U.S. military. Part IV discusses what effects the legislation
and directives have had on the trafficking in persons in the ROK, while Part
V will suggest more efficacious responses on the part of the U.S.
government to truly eliminate United States involvement in the creation and
maintenance of the demand for trafficked persons. This article will then
conclude that while there has been progress to lower United States
involvement with the use of trafficked persons in the ROK, to truly
accomplish the United States objective, a new DoD policy must be
instituted, then supplemented by an international cooperative approach.
The author was in the Army and stationed in the ROK from 2005 to
2006. Some of the observations in this Comment are from his experiences
and time spent in the ROK. The bulk of service, though, was spent around
Camp Casey and Tongduchon, ROK, the base town directly outside of
Camp Casey.
II. HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE ROK
Trafficking in persons (TIP) is a multi-faceted crime. It robs its
victims of human rights and freedoms, fuels global health risks, strengthens
organized crime, and impedes development. 5 Just as severe as the crime,
though, is the impact of TIP on its victims. The victims may suffer abuse,
12. See Havens, supra note 5.
13. The U.S., ROK, and the Philippines have made anti-prostitution laws. TIP REPORT 2009,
supra note 10, at 177, 240. See also Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub.
L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/10492.pdf
(last visited Sept. 29, 2010) [hereinafter Victims of Trafficking Act].
14. See Exec. Order 13387, 70 Fed. Reg. 60697(f) (Oct. 18, 2005) (detailing the elements of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice's (UCMJ) anti-prostitution regulations). But see Philippines
Stops, supra note 11 (noting that the Philippine crackdown on promoters within the Philippines has
drastically decreased the number of Filipinas in bars in some areas of the ROK).
15. TIP REPORT 2009, supra note 10, at 5.
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both physical and emotional, rape, threats, and even death. Moreover, it is
a threat to national security.17 Historically speaking, however, as long as
soldiers have been in uniform, prostitution has been present just outside the
organized military ranks.' 8
TIP is the third most profitable form of trafficking, right behind drugs
and arms,' 9 and has been a problem in the ROK for some time. The ROK
has come to be used as a major transit point by smugglers to traffic
primarily Asian women for the sex trade and domestic servitude.20  The
ROK is a source country for trafficked persons for other nations such as the
21United States, Japan, China, Guam, New Zealand, and Australia. It is a
destination country, however, for women from Russia, Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan, Mongolia, the People's Republic of China, the Philippines,
22Thailand, Cambodia, and other Southeast Asian countries. Brokers often
target poor women and runaways in less industrialized countries.23 The
broker may pay off her debts, and then use the act to coerce her into signing
a labor contract.24 The broker may also recruit her, promising that she will
be singing, dancing, and entertaining in other countries.2 5 Some brokers
even go so far as to hold "talent" auditions, where the young women go and
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. COMM'N ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, 108TH CONG., REPORT ON
ENFORCING U.S. POLICIES AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN PERSON: How IS THE U.S. MLITARY DOING?,
available at http://www.csce.gov/index.cfin?FuseAction=UserGroups.Home&ContentRecordid=287&
ContentType=B&UserGroup id=69 (last visited Sept. 14, 2010) [hereinafter HEARINGS] (testimony of
Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Chairman, U.S. Comm'n on Security and Cooperation in Europe).
19. Trafficking in Persons Report (2004) reports that trafficking in persons generated nearly
9.5 billion U.S. dollars in 2003, and is closely linked to money laundering, drug trafficking, document
forgery, and other international crimes. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 14
(2004), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/34158.pdf (last visited Sept. 14,
2010) [hereinafter TIP REPORT 2004].
20. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES: REPUBLIC OF KOREA (2001), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/
hrrpt/2001/eap/8336.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2010) (stating that in an effort to diminish human
trafficking and promote women's rights, the Ministry of Gender Equality was established).
21. See TIP REPORT 2009, supra note 10, at 176. A source country is the country of origin of
a group of trafficked persons.
22. Id. A destination country is the host country to the trafficked persons.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
audition to be entertainers for clients, with the promise of better pay in
other countries.26
What happens to the young women when they arrive at their
destination country is often very different from what is promised. Some
employers withhold their passports or wages.27 Some young women are
subjected to sexual exploitation,28 where upon arrival they are repeatedly
beaten, raped, and starved until they consent to working as the employer
desires. 29 Many are subjected to debt bondage, where the employer pays for
room and board, but the young woman does not make enough to ever pay
the employer back, thereby effectively working for free.o Some young
women are subjected to involuntary servitude.' Some young women are
even sent to other countries after working for a period of time in a different
location.32 And some young women are subjected to all of these atrocities
33
at once.
Traditionally, the U.S. military has left the task of regulating
prostitution patronage up to commanders,34 yielding different results with
each command.3 ' After the Korean War and the deployment of U.S. troops
to the peninsula, the supply of prostitutes grew proportionately to the
demand created for them by the soldiers' presence. 6 Throughout the last
century, the military was even involved in the regulation of prostitution,
26. Philippines Stops, supra note 11.
27. TIP REPORT 2009, supra note 10, at 176.
28. Id.
29. TIP REPORT 2009, supra note 10, at 14, 19, 22, 45.
30. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 200 (2010), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/142979.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2010) [hereinafter TIP
REPORT 2010] (reporting that employers withheld 20.5 million U.S. dollars in unpaid wages from 9,452
workers).
31. Id.
32. The author's personal knowledge and experiences; story of Ailyn, a former "drinky girl"
who married a friend of the author. On file with the author.
33. TIP REPORT 2009, supra note 10, at 14, 19, 22, 45.
34. Jorene Soto, "We're Here To Protect Democracy. We're Not Here To Practice It": The
U.S. Military's Involvement in Trafficking in Persons and Suggestions for the Future, 13 CARDOZo J.L.
& GENDER 561, 566 (2007).
35. Id. at 566-68.
36. Mary Jacoby, Does US Abet Korean Sex Trade?, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 9, 2002,
available at http://www.sptimes.com/2002/12/09/newspflWorldandnation/DoesUSabetKorean
s.shtml (last visited July 21, 2010). See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 27
(2007), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/82902.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2010)
[hereinafter TIP REPORT 2007] (stating that where prostitution is tolerated, there is a greater demand for
trafficked persons, especially women and children).
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through officially approved brothels, prostitution procurement, and tracking
prostitutes with sexually transmitted diseases. Some commands
prohibited prostitution, as well as ploys that disguise prostitution, such as
hiring "maids,"3  but some commands looked the other way.
Presently in Korea, around the military camps and bases, the primary
use for trafficked persons is in barber shops, massage parlors, and bars,
especially.40 These establishments are not the traditional brothels of history
passed. Rather, it is prostitution adapted, sometimes called "industrialized
prostitution."4" Its primary adaptation has been to mask the prostitution, or
the related sexual exploitation of these young women, behind the
respectable fagade of a legitimate business.4 2 However, the purpose these
establishments serve is common knowledge.
For example, most soldiers are told upon arrival in the ROK that a
barber shop with two barber poles indicates a haircut with a "happy
ending," meaning after the haircut, someone performs oral sex or has
intercourse with the client." For massage parlors, the prostitution is more
covert. In the ROK, it is typical for a blind or visually impaired person to
be a masseuse, as only they may become licensed masseurs.45  What is not
typical of a Korean massage, however, is a secret room to which clients are
taken to have sex. In those massage parlors TIP and prostitution are often
present.46
37. Isabelle Talleyrand, Note, Military Prostitution: How the Authorities Worldwide Aid and
Abet International Trafficking in Women, 27 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 151, 152 (2000) [hereinafter
Talleyrand].
38. Commander Patrick Joseph Gibbons, Redeeming Peacekeeping: Using the UN Security
Council to Internationalize the U.S. Military Ban on Prostitution Patronage, 200 MIL. L. REV. 1, 34
(2009) [hereinafter Gibbons].
39. Id. at 35.
40. TIP REPORT 2007, supra note 36, at 30.
41. Talleyrand, supra 37, at 154.
42. TIP REPORT 2007, supra note 36, at 27. A brothel will be placed on the off-limits list, as it
will violate both the ROK and the UCMJ's anti-prostitution laws and anti-TIP policies. See Havens,
supra note 5.
43. See generally Seth Robson, A Red-Light Kind ofNight, STARS AND STRIPES, Aug. 1, 2004,
available at http://www.stripes.com/news/a-red-light-kind-of-night-1.22299 (last visited Sept. 15, 2010)
[hereinafter Red-Light].
44. The author's personal knowledge and experiences; the author was informed of this
phenomenon during his initial tour of the "ville." See also Red-Light, supra note 43.
45. Blind S. Korea Masseurs Win Case, BBC NEWS, Oct. 30, 2008,
http:/Inews.bbc.co.uk/2/hilasia-pacific/7699114.stm (last visited Sept. 15, 2010).
46. Recount of a peer's experience at London Massage in Seoul, Korea in 2006. On file with
the author.
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The bars and clubs near military bases have to be the most covert. If
the Inspector General (IG) discovers that the bar is being used as a cover for
prostitution, the bar or club will be placed on the off-limits list.47
Categorically placing these bars and clubs off-limits could be devastating to
the businesses, and the implications could be national, as normally they
have government licenses to operate their businesses, and receive tax
benefits for catering specifically to foreigners.48
For clever bar and club owners, however, their trafficked persons work
as strippers, and essentially escorts.49 In 2004, for ten to twenty dollars, a
soldier could buy a drink, approximately three ounces of juice, in exchange
for the company of a "drinky girl."50 For the duration of her drink, she will
sit and converse with the patron who bought it for her, at least to whatever
extent her English capabilities permit.5 1  A soldier can also purchase her
time. For example, if a soldier takes a liking to a particular "drinky girl,"
he will pay the mama san52 an undisclosed amount so that he can take the
"drinky girl" out for part of the day.5 3 Sometimes there is a curfew, which
requires the "drinky girl" to be back at the bar to solicit other clients for
drinks. But what happens during the time spent away from the bar with the
soldier is not the responsibility of the mama san. She may not "officially"
rent out prostitutes, but she does facilitate an escort service.54
47. See Philippines Stops, supra note 11. See also Havens, supra note 5; HEARINGS, supra
note 18.
48. Havens, supra note 5.
49. Sex may be involved, even if it is never mentioned. The author's personal knowledge and
experiences; the author knew numerous soldiers who purchased the woman's time to take her on "a
date."
50. Havens, supra note 5.
51. Id.
52. A mama son is a woman who works in a supervisory role in brothels and drinking
establishments. Glossary of Military Terms & Slang from the Vietnam War,
http://www2.iath.virginia.edulsixties/HTMLdocs/Resources/Glossary/Sixties TermGloss_K_P.html
(last visited Oct. 23, 2010).
53. Often, though, if a "drinky girl" does not sell her quota, she will be subjected to a "bar
fine," where she is pushed to have sex with a client to make up for the lack in drink sales. See Havens,
supra note 5; Philippines Stops, supra note 11. A "bar fine" has also been defined as the fee a soldier
pays for the "drinky girl" to have a "night off," and generally sex occurs. See Emily Nyen Chang, Note,
Engagement Abroad: Enlisted Men, U.S. Military Policy and the Sex Industry, 15 ND J. L. ETHICS &
PUB POL'Y 621, n.151 (2001).
54. Statement made based on author's observation that a bar owner can avoid being labeled a
brothel ifthis bar owner does not officially condone the sex.
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II. THE ATTACK ON HUMAN TRAFFICKING
The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act was passed by
Congress in 2000.5s The purpose of this act was to combat TIP, which the
act calls a modem form of slavery, and to also ensure punishment of
traffickers while protecting its victims.5 6  In 2002, President George W.
Bush published the National Security Presidential Directive Twenty-Two
(NSPD-22).s Part of this directive was an adoption of a zero-tolerance
policy for the participation in TIP by any government employee, military or
civilian.58 Included in this directive was a policy requiring all departments
to develop policies to educate and punish employees who participate in TIP,
whether the involvement was in the actual trafficking, or the solicitation of
sexual acts from a trafficked person. In 2003, a congressional letter was
sent to the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) expressing
concern about what the DoD was doing in response to alleged military
personnel and contractor participation in sex trafficking.60 NSPD-22 had
ordered an expedited implementation of its policy.6 1 However, it was not
until 2004 that the DoD distributed an instructional memo regarding a
policy implementation as was ordered by the presidential directive.62
Also in 2004, the DoD IG appeared before the House Committee on
Armed Services. In his opinion he stated that one of the main issues for
the continued TIP problem was that leaders had failed to "promulgate and
enforce principle-based standards for subordinates who create the demand
for prostitution, generally, and for sex slavery specifically."6 As a partial
reaction to the DoD IG's opinion statement before the House Committee,
55. Victims of Trafficking Act, supra note 13.
56. Id. § 102(a).
57. DEP'T OF DEF., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., EVALUATION OF THE DOD EFFORTS TO
COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 63-69 (2006) [hereinafter EVALUATION OF DOD EFFORTS 2006].
58. Id. at 66.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 57.
61. Id. at 69.
62. EVALUATION OF DOD EFFORTS, supra note 57, at 66. The 2004 Instructional memo was
reauthorized and amended on February 16, 2007. The author does not intend to demonstrate that this is
all the U.S. anti-human trafficking law, programs, etc. The author only includes what law is most
pertinent to this article.
63. Joseph E. Schmitz, Inspector General of the Department of Defense, Implementing the
Department of Defense "Zero Tolerance" Policy With Regard to Trafficking in Humans, Statement
Before the House Committee on Armed Services and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (Sept. 21, 2004).
64. Id. at 5.
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the Uniformed Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) was amended to
criminalize prostitution.6 Before the amendment, prostitution was
punishable under the UCMJ by one of its catch-all clauses, but it was not
enforced consistently. 6 Then, in 2005, as a response to the 2003
congressional letter, the DoD IG announced that it was launching an
evaluative initiative to test the effectiveness of the newly implemented DoD
programs.67 With the criminalization of prostitution and its related
practices under the UCMJ, and the education and awareness TIP programs
promulgated by the DoD, the DoD had almost fully realized compliance in
accordance with NSPD-22.68
IV. PROSTITUTION DIMINISHED: IT'S NOT ENOUGH
In 2007, there were ninety-four million sex trade transactions in the
ROK, which was down from 170 million in 2002.69 The marked
improvement has been credited to both the ROK's pursuance of an anti-
prostitution agenda, as well as the UCMJ legislation that governs the U.S.
soldiers on the peninsula.70
The DoD IG reported that the United States Forces Korea (USFK) had
made great progress in regards to their mission to educate service members
65. See Exec. Order No. 13387, 70 Fed. Reg. 60697 (Oct. 14, 2005). The UCMJ is a
separate body of criminal law that governs military personnel.
66. Gibbons, supra note 38, at 35. See 10 U.S.C. § 892 (2000). This regulation proscribes the
elements necessary for any soldier who fails to obey a regulation or order:
Any person subject to this chapter who-
(1) Violates or fails to obey any lawful general order or regulation;
(2) Having knowledge of any other lawful order issued by a member of the
armed forces, which it is his duty to obey, fails to obey the order; or
(3) Is derelict in the performance of his duties; shall be punished as a court-
martial may direct.
67. See EVALUATION OF DOD EFFORTS 2006, supra note 57, at 80.
68. Id. at 28.
69. GI Korea, Korean Prostitution Tops 14 Trillion Won A Year, ROK DROP, Sept. 20, 2008,
http://rokdrop.com/2008/09/20/korean-prostitution-tops-14-trillion-won-a-year/ (last visited Sept. 24,
2010); Tom Henheffer, South Korea Takes on Prostitution, MACLEANS.CA, Feb. 18, 2010,
http://www2.macleans.ca/2010/02/18/south-korea-takes-on-prostitution/print/ (last visited Sept. 24,
2010) (both stating that according to the Korea Women's Development Institute, sex trade accounts for
1.6 percent of Korea's gross domestic product).
70. TIP REPORT 2009, supra note 10, at 177. "The ROK prohibits trafficking for the purpose
of commercial sexual exploitation, including debt bondage, through its 2004 'Act on the Punishment of
Intermediating in the Sex Trade and Associated Acts,' which prescribes up to ten years' imprisonment. .
. ." These penalties are similar to those of other serious crimes, like rape. The ROK also criminalizes
labor trafficking under the Labor Standards Act.
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about illegal prostitution and TIP.7' The DoD IG's prediction of the USFK
leadership's strong commitment to the NSPD-22 was found to be accurate
when evaluating its efforts in 2006.72 But even with these marked
improvements, there is evidence of TIP less than 200 meters off of military
camps such as Camp Casey.73
The USFK worked diligently to equate prostitution with trafficking in
persons,74 and has done so by designing the educational programs to
correlate prostitution with trafficking in persons.7s Since the response to
NSPD-22 was to criminalize prostitution, correlating prostitution with
trafficking in persons would seem to be an efficient way to promulgate the
anti-TIP policy, as established by Congress and President George W. Bush.
This method has been successful in respect to the anti-prostitution
amendment to the UCMJ.76  In fact, the DoD IG's 2006 evaluation found
that participants in the "sensing sessions" did not identify any U.S.
personnel involved in "actual trafficking." 7 However, if trafficking in
persons is associated with only prostitution, essentially these results, at best,
only indicate that the participants did not know, or admit that they knew,
any soldiers whose off-base activities included the patronization of
prostitutes.78  While the sample population was a large percentage of the
actual population,7 9 the sample was primarily asked about soldier
participation in prostitution, not trafficked persons working in other roles.so
71. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, ASSESSMENT OF DOD EFFORTS
TO COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS: PHASE I-UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA 14 (2003)
[hereinafter PHASE I REPORT].
72. Id. at 13; EVALUATION OF DOD EFFORTS 2006, supra note 57, at 28.
73. Jon Rabiroff, South Korean 'Juicy Bar' Owners Hear Army's Concerns, STARS AND
STRIPES, Feb. 6, 2010, available at http://www.stripes.com/news/south-korean-juicy-bar-owners-hear-
army-s-concerns-1.98654 (last visited July 22, 2010) [hereinafter Owners Hear] (stating that USFK
officials are working on a response to a question of whether the extreme measures taking by the Filipino
government ought to prompt a USFK policy change towards juicy bars. Also stating that two local
establishments in 2010 were placed on the off-limits list for TIP violations.).
74. EVALUATION OF DOD EFFORTS 2006, supra note 57, at 28.
75. Id.
76. See Exec. Order 13387, 70 Fed. Reg. at 60697 (Oct. 14, 2005).
77. Id.
78. The DoD IG used a Web-based survey which yielded approximately 10,000 responses. Id.
There is no indication in the report that the DoD IG used any sort of statistical measurement tool to
account for soldiers' tendencies to protect their peers. From the beginning of basic training until a
soldier retires, soldiers are engrained with a sense loyalty to their comrades, which is taught through a
variety of methods. Admitting one of their comrades had used a prostitute would very likely be a breach
of that loyalty.
79. Id. The U.S. soldier population in the ROK was lowered to 28,500 soldiers in 2008. See
Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense & Lee Sang-hee, ROK Minister of National Defense, U.S. Troop
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It is clear that a business establishment must not be a front for a
brothel in order to keep its name from the off-limits list.8 ' But there is still
a niche in the market for trafficked persons, thus, the formidable demand is
sustained. As illustrated earlier, a bar may not engage in prostitution, but
there are other jobs that the trafficked persons may perform.82 During the
course of a career as a "drinky girl," for example, a woman may never
solicit sex from soldiers, but she will solicit twenty dollar drinks in
exchange for her companionship.83 Although there is nothing illegal about
soliciting ridiculously expensive juice, the underlying issue is that there is
still a function, and thus a demand, for trafficked persons. Bar and club
owners have found a way to continue the use of their trafficked persons in
order to make a profit. Although the DoD has reported that it is in
compliance with NSPD-22," it has not efficaciously eliminated soldier
participation in TIP, in the sense that when a soldier buys one of these
women a drink, he has validated her reason for being there.
The criminalization of prostitution under the UCMJ, while a necessary
improvement, does not strike at the heart of what Congress and the
President sought to purge: U.S. troop involvement in TIP. Regarding only
the sexual exploitation of trafficked women, in order to minimize and
eliminate any U.S. troop involvement in this criminal activity, there must be
zero demand for these women. If a demand persists, then the trafficking
will continue, as it has proven to be a highly adaptable racket, as
demonstrated by the juicy bars in the ROK."
The DoD has stopped short of systematically placing all juicy bars on
the off-limits list, as they have done to other types of establishments.
Given that the ROK licenses and gives tax incentives to such
Levels in South Korea will Remain at 28,500 (Oct. 17, 2008), available at
http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2008/October/20081020121847eaifas0.7119104.html (last
visited Sept. 24, 2010) [hereinafter Gates Brief]. The DoD IG's sample population accounted for
approximately one-third of the total number of soldiers stationed on the peninsula.
80. EVALUATION OF DOD EFFORTS 2006, supra note 57, at 88-91.
81. Philippines Stops, supra note 11. See also Havens, supra note 5.
82. Both ROK authorities and the DoD suspect that prostitution occurs at juicy bars, even if
not overtly. But ROK governmental oversight is lacking, and the implications of placing all juicy bars
off-limits could cause problems for both the ROK and the U.S. military. See generally Havens, supra
note 5.
83. Id.
84. See PHASE I REPORT, supra note 71, at 13.
85. See TIP REPORT 2004, supra note 19, at 14.
86. See Philippines Stops, supra note 11. The DoD has long placed the "glass house"
establishments off-limits. These establishments have large glass windows where prostitutes sit in the
windows like meat hangs in a butcher shop window. Id.
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establishments, and the large economic effect these establishments have on
tourism, the DoD's hesitancy seems justified.
The DoD has further considerations, as well, besides just the economic
implications of a ban on all juicy bars. In 2008, the United States and the
ROK agreed that approximately 28,500 soldiers would remain in Korea.88
The bulk of these soldiers spend at least some evenings and some of their
free time at one of the approximately 200 entertainment establishments that
receive a tax break for catering to foreigners.89 In 2006, the vast majority
of juicy bar establishments that were near base areas were staffed by
Filipinas.90 Should they be placed off-limits, none of the camps would
likely be able to accommodate the recreational needs of so many soldiers.91
This lack of off-base venue alternatives would tax the military's resources,
and would potentially be problematic for the USFK when dealing with
restless, bored soldiers.
V. SUGGESTIONS AND PREDICTIONS
The DoD has viable options for exterminating U.S. troop involvement
with TIP. One method for addressing U.S. soldiers' contact with trafficked
persons can be derived from the actions of the Filipino government. There
is evidence to suggest a correlation between the Filipino government
denying promoter requests to recruit Filipina women to send to base-area
bars and the recently lower amounts of Filipina women at these locations. 92
The DoD, in an effort to suppress the flow of women to the base-area bars,
could work with source countries whose women supply the trafficking
demand. While the efforts of the Filipino government have made
remarkable improvements, they only affect the U.S. soldiers' interaction
with potentially trafficked Filipinas. Source country actions such as these
do not eliminate the demand for trafficked persons; rather, they leave a void
which can be filled by trafficked persons of other nationalities. One
potential conflict with this idea, though, is that if there is not a DoD
87. Id.; Havens, supra note 5.
88. Gates Brief, supra note 79.
89. See Havens, supra note S.
90. See Philippines Stops, supra note 11.
91 . The USFK spent $3.4 million to improve its morale, welfare, and recreation facilities in
2004, after taking a survey of soldiers to identify what areas needed funding prioritization.
EVALUATION OF DOD EFFORTS 2006, supra note 57, at 27-28.
92. See Philippines Stops, supra note I1. Currently, promoters are supposed to get the
approval of the Filipino government to recruit Filipina women. This article, however, reports that
promoters and recruiters continue to find illegal methods for getting around the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration.
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presence in the source country, it could be difficult for the DoD to work
with public officials to take the appropriate, traffic-halting actions. Source
country actions only protect their populations, and are not likely, in and of
themselves, to eliminate the demand.
The DoD has touted another potential method as a goal to continue to
fight TIP.93 Recently, it attempted, albeit a weak attempt, to stifle the
involvement of U.S. troops with trafficked persons.94 The DoD, in pursuit
of its anti-TIP mandate, would coach and "develop alternative business
models that appeal to military personnel and promote entertainment that
does not contribute to or attract demand for trafficked women." 5 The
business model by which the bars make a profit must be addressed. This,
however, may prove to be difficult because some juicy bar owners believe
that if there is no girl, then there is no customer.9 6
In February 2010, U.S. Army officials met with local bar owners
outside Camp Casey to address the Army's concerns about TIP and other
issues. What basically ensued were the Army officials' statements that
there needs to be change.98 The bar owners could interpret this statement as
a warning, but the DoD did not offer any sort of guidance, resource, or
alternative to help them change their practices. While it is not the
responsibility of the DoD to teach local bar owners how to run their
businesses, the DoD has an interest in their business practices. As
mentioned earlier, the USFK could not likely cope with the recreational
needs of all its soldiers should the juicy bars be categorically placed on the
off-limits list. If the DoD's objective is to eliminate all U.S. troop
involvement in TIP, then it would behoove the DoD to propose valid
alternative business plans to help realize its objective.
The UCMJ's targeting of prostitution is not enough to truly eradicate
U.S. troop involvement with trafficked persons in the ROK. To absolutely
eliminate the U.S.-made demand for trafficked persons, it follows that the
DoD would have to prohibit any sort of contact between soldiers and
trafficked persons. The contact would have to be prohibited if it is the
reason for which the trafficked person was brought to the establishment to
93. EVALUATION OF DOD EFFORTS 2006, supra note 57, at 27.
94. See Owners Hear, supra note 73.
95. EVALUATION OF DOD EFFORTS 2006, supra note 57, at 27.
96. See Philippines Stops, supra note 11.
97. See generally Owners Hear, supra note 86.
98. Id.
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make money for their employer.99 Since the DoD has limited regulatory
power, especially in a foreign country, the only absolute behavior it can
control is where soldiers spend their free time, as it has no official
regulatory power over the Korean businesses that utilize trafficked
persons. 00
For the DoD, to eliminate commercial contact between soldiers and
trafficked persons, it would have to place every club with potentially
trafficked people on the off-limits list. This is the most obvious way to
keep soldiers away from trafficked persons. This idea is fraught with
complications.to' What the DoD can realistically do, and what is actually in
its control, is a policy change in regards to the juicy bars. If all juicy bars
are placed on the off-limits list until they can prove that they harbor no
trafficked persons and prostitution is strictly not practiced, then the DoD
can ensure that U.S. soldiers are not involved with TIP. The burden of
proof should fall on the bar owners. If they wish to maintain the U.S.
soldiers' business, then they will adapt and prove their compliance.
What will be required of the DoD to ensure continued policy
compliance will be frequent and random investigations into each
establishment that soldiers are permitted to patronize. The very fact that the
Filipino government has discontinued granting permission to recruiters for
the recruitment of Filipina women for base-area bars in the ROK suggests
that there are a number of human rights violations from which the Filipino
government wishes to protect its citizens.10 2 Furthermore, the ROK would
also have an interest in policing these establishments in conjunction with
the DoD. Since these establishments are given tax breaks, 03 and the
individual women are supposed to be cleared by the Korean government,
(not to mention the importance of these establishments to the national
economy) 05 then the ROK should be negotiated with to help ensure
compliance with both ROK and DoD anti-TIP policies. A policy change of
this magnitude would, at minimum, require the vigilance and persistence of
99. For example, the "drinky girls" are brought to the base-area bars to flirt with service
members and solicit drinks. This income producing contact with soldiers is their purpose in the
establishment. See Philippines Stops, supra note 11.
100. The only regulatory influence the USFK has over ROK businesses is its ability to place an
establishment on the off-limits list. Businesses that desire to keep the U.S. soldiers' business may have
an interest in complying with the USFK demands.
101. See supra notes 99-100. See generally Owners Hear, supra note 73.
102. See generally Philippines Stops, supra note 11.
103. Havens, supra note 5.
104. Id. See also TIP REPORT 2009, supra note 10, at 176.
105. Havens, supra note 5.
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both the ROK and the DoD.106 Further sanctions may even be required by
the ROK when an establishment is found to have violated the anti-TIP
policies. Potential sanctions could include revoking their licenses to
operate the business, fines, or any other measure that will convey the
seriousness of the issue, and strongly encourage compliance.
At the administrative level, for a policy such as this to be effectuated,
an appropriate decision-maker in the DoD will need to act on the belief or
order that eliminating U.S. soldier involvement with TIP is more important
than the temporary economic impact that a policy change may have on the
ROK. It will require someone with the proper authority, vision, and
commitment to the anti-TIP policies, who can also work with the USFK
commanders to negotiate the necessary changes and compliance within the
ROK.
A change of this magnitude must be thoroughly planned in order to
minimize the potential negative effects on the ROK and the USFK. For
example, as part of the policy transition, funds may need to be delegated to
further the development of recreational alternatives for the soldiers during
the transition period. It may need to include funding for the education of
the local base-area bar owners and to help train ROK law enforcement in
indicators of TIP. 0 7
VI. CONCLUSION
While the current legislation has undoubtedly affected TIP practices
near military camps and bases in the ROK, it is not sufficient to accomplish
the U.S. anti-TIP agenda. A change must also come in the USFK's
educational policy. It is not enough to equate TIP with only prostitution.
Many of the bars utilizing trafficked persons do not engage in prostitution
to the effect of even being placed on the off-limits list. Yet, they still
participate in the TIP cycle that Congress and President George W. Bush
wished to address. Although the USFK may have realized compliance with
NSPD-22 by associating prostitution with the TIP agenda, it has not
sufficiently freed the U.S. soldiers of all demand-causing behavior.
Therefore, to truly eradicate U.S. soldier involvement with TIP, it will be
necessary to revamp the TIP awareness programs to include all forms of
trafficked persons, and a policy change toward the juicy bars must become
a reality. Only with a hard line drawn in the sand, can the United States
truly exonerate itself of its involvement.
106. The U.S. DoD recognizes that it cannot solve the TIP problem by itself. PHASE I REPORT,
supra note 71, at 14.
107. TIP REPORT 2010, supra note 30, at 201 (reporting that the ROK's lack of a system to
identify trafficking victims among vulnerable groups limited its ability to assist victims).
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